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THE ASEAN CHARTER AS "LEGS TO GO PLACES": IDEATIONAL
NORMS AND PRAGMATIC LEGALISM IN COMMUNITY
BUILDING IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
by EUGENE K.B. TAN*
The Charter of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has been hailed as a legal
instrument that would integrate the ten constituent members as a community and a regional
organization. Ostensibly, the Charter has three strategic thrusts in support of the vision of
the ASEAN Community. The first is to formalize ASEAN as an institution while streamlining
its decision-making processes. Secondly, the Charter seeks to strengthen ASEAN institutions.
Thirdly, it seeks to establish mechanisms to monitor compliance and settle disputes. The
article considers the extent to which the Charter will help ASEAN achieve its aims. This is
especially pertinent in light of the Charter's reaffirmation of ASEAN's longstanding policy of
non-interference in members' internal affairs and the retention of consultation and consensus
as a fundamental tenet of decision-making. It also considers whether the Charter will facilitate
the creation of new norms and values, and protect democracy and human rights.
"With the ASEAN Charter, ASEAN will have legs to go places." 1
ASEAN Annual Report 2007-2008 (July 2008)
On 15 December 2008, the ASEAN Charter 2 (henceforth, "the Charter") came into force
in less than ideal circumstances. The event was supposed to be celebrated during the
course of the 14th ASEAN Summit in Chiang Mai. Perhaps, as a reflection of the rela-
tive (un-)importance of ASEAN in the domestic agendas of member countries, that Summit
was postponed, at the eleventh hour, to February 2009 as a result of the internal political
crisis in Thailand (the current ASEAN Chair). Instead, a much smaller scale ceremony,
involving foreign ministers of member states, was held on 15 December 2008 at the ASEAN
Secretariat in Jakarta, Indonesia, to welcome the entry into force of the Charter.3 Earlier,
Indonesia, a key member state, was the last member to ratify the Charter, and with condi-
tions attached.4 The Preah Vihear temple border dispute between Thailand and Cambodia
* Eugene K.B. Tan is assistant professor of law at the School of Law, Singapore Management University (SMU).
An earlier version of this paper was first presented at the HKU-NUS-SMU Symposium: "The Common Law
Tradition in Asia" in Singapore, 1-2 December 2008. Many thanks to the participants for their insightful
comments. I am also grateful to the anonymous reviewers for their careful review of the paper, and for
the suggestions made to improve the paper. Research support for this project was provided under the SMU
Faculty Research Grant (project number: 08-C234-SMU-001), and is gratefully acknowledged. The usual
caveats apply.
Association of Southeast Asian Nations, ASEAN Annual Report 2007-2008 (July 2008) at 7.
2 Charter of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 20 November 2007, (entered into force 15 December
2008), online: ASEAN <http://www.aseansec.org/AC.htm> [ASEAN Charter].
3 ASEAN Secretariat, "Latest News-Ceremony to welcome the Entry Into Force of the ASEAN Charter" (15
December 2008), online: 14th ASEAN Summit <http://www.14thaseansummit.orglatest-news03.php>.
4 The addendum to the ratification legislation stated that the Indonesian government was to work for early
amendments (including the implementation of a genuine human rights mechanism), a reform of decision-
making procedures, and greater people involvement in ASEAN. See, further, helpful discussion on Indonesia's
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also cast a shadow on the centrality of the Charter vis-ei-vis resolving disputes between
member states.
A year earlier, on 20 November 2007, ASEAN heads of government signed the Charter at
the 13th ASEAN Summit in Singapore. Although the signing was meant to be the "crown-
ing achievement" of ASEAN's 40th anniversary, it was anything but climactic at ASEAN's
so-called coming-of-age party.' The signing was overshadowed, if not overwhelmed, by
Myanmar military junta's intransigence over its human rights abuses and its brutal crack-
down on the so-called "Saffron Revolution" in September 2007.6 Specifically, the Myanmar
debacle, which had been simmering in the last few years, marked ASEAN's seeming help-
lessness as a regional organization in reining in a recalcitrant member. Prior to September
2007, the self-congratulatory hubris portrayed the Charter as a legal instrument that would
bind the ten constituent nation-states in the Southeast Asian region together as a commu-
nity. Despite the Charter coming into force, a significant pall continues to hang over ASEAN
over the critical themes of regionalism, democracy, and security. 7 The burning question is
whether the Charter will be more rhetoric and form, rather than substance.
ASEAN was born out of idealism and necessity framed within a strategic context of
preserving peace for the purpose of national and regional development in what was hitherto a
tumultuous region in a turbulent period. Forty years on, ASEAN faces significant challenges
in the economic and political spheres. The rise of China and India as regional powers in
the twenty-first century has necessitated that ASEAN remains relevant and be firmly in the
driving seat on matters concerning Southeast Asia and its immediate locale.8 Ostensibly the
Charter has three strategic thrusts, all in support of the vision of the ASEAN Community.
The first is to formalize ASEAN as an institution while also streamlining its decision-making
processes. Secondly, the Charter seeks to strengthen ASEAN institutions, especially the
Secretariat. Thirdly, it seeks to establish mechanisms to monitor compliance of ASEAN
agreements and settle disputes between member states. Overall, the Charter aspires to
strengthen ASEAN as a leading regional organization while catalyzing ASEAN's integration
efforts on various fronts.9
This article examines the ASEAN Charter's ability to operate as the legal and institutional
framework for Southeast Asia's foremost inter-governmental organization. The article con-
siders the extent to which the Charter will help ASEAN achieve the three strategic thrusts
stated above. It will also consider whether the Charter will make ASEAN more effective
and a rules-based organization. This is especially pertinent in light of the Charter's reaf-
firmation of ASEAN's longstanding policy of non-interference in members' internal affairs
delayed ratification of the Charter in J. Ruland, "Deepening ASEAN Cooperation through Democratization?
The Indonesian Legislature and Foreign Policymaking" (2009) 9 Int'l Relat. Asia-Pac. 373 at 381-388.
s Cebu Declaration on the Blueprint of the ASEAN Charter, 13 January 2007, online: ASEAN <http://
www.aseansec.org/19257.htm>.
6 The junta continues to scorn world opinion and ASEAN has had little impact on Myanmar's conduct. See
The International Crisis Group, "Burma/Myanmar: After the Crackdown" Asia Report No. 144 (31 January
2008).
7 For an erudite and incisive analysis on these themes, see the thought-provoking essay by D.K. Emmer-
son, "Critical Terms: Security, Democracy, and Regionalism in Southeast Asia" in D.K. Emmerson, ed.,
Hard Choices: Security, Democracy, and Regionalism in Southeast Asia (Stanford, CA: Walter H. Shoren-
stein Asia-Pacific Research Centre, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Stanford University,
2008).
8 This angst is probably most acutely felt by Singapore, which has often described itself as an oasis in a turbulent
region: "PM calls on Asean to take decisive action"Straits Times (8 August 2007).
9 See T. Chalermpalanupap, "Institutional Reform: One Charter, Three Communities, Many Challenges" in
Emmerson, supra note 7. The UN Secretary-General has affirmed the shared role of regional organizations in
resolving crises that occur in their regions and that regionalism as a component of multilateralism is necessary
and feasible. See Report of the Secretary-General on the relationship between the United Nations and regional
organizations, in particular the African Union, in the maintenance of international peace and security, UN
SCOR, 7 April 2008, UN Doc. S/2008/186.
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and the retention of consultation and consensus as a fundamental tenet of decision-making
in ASEAN. Finally, it considers whether the Charter will be a driver in the creation of new
norms, values, and a community protective of democracy, rule of law, good governance and
the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms.
In this article, I argue that, at a general level, the development and interpretation of
ASEAN norms, in particular the "ASEAN Way", evolves much like the same way the com-
mon law develops. Some norms such as non-interference in the domestic affairs of member
states and consensual decision-making are presented, mistakenly, as iron-clad principles or
laws that are non-negotiable and for which deviation is not possible. I argue that these
norms are subject to change, even if that takes place incrementally. The norms, principles
and values found in the ASEAN Charter should be seen in this light. I also put forth the
proposition that the Charter while categorized as "hard law" was drafted with the purpose
of encouraging the internalization and reflexive learning of ASEAN norms within the con-
text of an organization that is charting new directions in a rapidly changing world. This
is also in keeping with the character of ASEAN. The soft law approach seeks to generate
norms and responsive conduct by member states of ASEAN that become self-enforcing and
self-reinforcing and thus providing the substratum for ASEAN to be a relevant, responsive,
and responsible player in regional affairs.
I. GENESIS OF THE CHARTER: INTEGRATING TO SURVIVE?
ASEAN is a potpourri of ten Southeast Asian nation-states held together by their com-
monality of membership in ASEAN but suitably distinguished by their immense diversity.1 °
Politically, Singapore, Cambodia and, to a lesser extent, Malaysia are dominated by a single
party. The Philippines is a democracy although it has a history of military coups and extra-
legal political changes. Indonesia has been rapidly democratizing since the end of Suharto's
32-year reign in 1998. Thailand is undergoing perhaps its most severe democratic chal-
lenge in two decades. Vietnam and Laos are communist states while Brunei is a monarchy.
Myanmar, ASEAN's black sheep, is ruled by a repressive military junta that is also bent
on isolationism. Economically, the countries are at different stages of economic develop-
ment with fairly widespread human development challenges. 1 Nonetheless, ASEAN's large
market of half a billion people generates a gross regional product of US$1.1 trillion, and
accounts for a total trade of about US$1.6 trillion. 12
Over the last forty years, ASEAN has also developed good relations and maintained
healthy engagements with existing and emerging powers such as the United States, Japan,
Russia, China, India and Korea through its dialogue partner and "ASEAN-plus" platforms.
There are also several bilateral and plurilateral free trade agreements between ASEAN
member states and their economic partners. The concern, however, among the more eco-
nomically advanced member states is over China (and increasingly India) continuing to draw
10 Useful primers on ASEAN include S. Siddique and S. Kumar, eds., The 2nd ASEAN Reader (Singapore: Insti-
tute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003), R.C. Severino, ASEAN (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies,
2008), and M. Beeson, Institutions of the Asia-Pacific: ASEAN, APEC, and Beyond (London: Routledge,
2009).
1 For a good overview of the status and trends of human development in Southeast Asia, see UNESCAP, Ten as
One: Challenges and Opportunities for ASEAN Integration (Bangkok: United Nations Economic & Social
Commission for Asia & the Pacific, 2007); UNDP, South-East Asia Regional Economic Integration and
Cooperation: Deepening and Broadening the Benefits for Human Development (Colombo: United Nations
Development Programme Regional Centre, 2006). This article does not consider whether the Charter will
help narrow the development gap between members, which range from newly-industrializing economies such
as Singapore to poverty-stricken ones like Myanmar, Cambodia and Laos.
12 Speech by Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong at the Opening Ceremony of the 40th ASEAN Economic Ministers
and Related Meetings, Singapore, 26 August 2008, para. 5.
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a disproportionate share of foreign direct investments from Southeast Asia. 13 ASEAN needs
to tap into these growth engines and also remake itself as a desirable investment destination
or risk economic marginalization.
14
Not surprisingly, ASEAN has thus far not sought the pooling of sovereignty like the
European Union, comprising 27 member states and 490 million citizens. Despite its fair
share of difficulties and disagreements and lacking natural coherence, ASEAN has been
a fairly cohesive grouping of member states. It has engendered intra-regional amity and
comity within Southeast Asia by nurturing a culture of mutual respect and mutual accom-
modation in bilateral and multilateral interactions among ASEAN member states.1 s To
that extent, ASEAN has been facilitative of regional economic development by providing a
stable regional political order. Although ASEAN has been likened to the European Union
(EU), ASEAN members are realistic that the community-building will not be as intensive
and extensive as the EU. 16 The ASEAN leadership is alive to the reality and challenges of the
diversity of history, culture, politics, language, religion and economic development within
ASEAN for it to be integrated into a union like the EU with components such as a judiciary
and legislature for the entire region.
The drive to ensure ASEAN's continued relevance was internally driven with the original
members concerned, to varying degrees, that ASEAN was atrophying. Its lack of legal
personality and clear rules of engagement were regarded as hampering its functionality as
the foremost inter-governmental organization in Southeast Asia, and perhaps even in Asia
generally. To put simply, ASEAN suffers from the perception of being less than the sum of its
parts." There remains the concern that a weakened ASEAN could be a source of instability
in Southeast Asia. Further, ASEAN's internal weaknesses will negate its effectiveness and
relevance as a regional organization. Externally, much has been made of the rise of China
and India and how important it is for ASEAN to position itself to leverage on these growth
engines.' 8 In security matters, ASEAN was instrumental in establishing the ASEAN Regional
13 J. Ravenhill, "Is China an Economic Threat to Southeast Asia" (2006) 46 Asian Sur. 653; M. Bhaskaran,
"The Economic Impact of China and India on Southeast Asia" in Daljit Singh and Lorraine Carlos Salazar,
eds., Southeast Asian Affairs 2005 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Affairs, 2006) at 62. In terms of
purchasing power parity, ASEAN, China and India combined account for a quarter of the world's economy.
14 Because of its heavy dependence on trade and foreign investment, Singapore is probably the most anxious.
Singapore's Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong expresses it thus at the ASEAN Day Lecture on 7 August 2007
in Singapore, para. 9:
To stay in the game, ASEAN must take decisive action. We must become a strong and effective
grouping, able to partner China and India effectively. Many investors today see ASEAN as ten isolated,
scattered national economies, too small to be worth paying attention to. If ASEAN's integration
stagnates while the rest of Asia forges ahead, we will be left behind and become irrelevant.
15 This has led to the self-congratulatory mantra that "no two ASEAN member states have ever gone to war
with each other". However, the past is not a reliable guide to the future if ASEAN becomes increasingly
fragmented.
16 For the similarities and differences between regionalism and integration in the EU and ASEAN, see
L. Henry, "The ASEAN Way and Community Integration: Two Different Models of Regionalism" (2007) 13
Eur. L. J. 857. See also E. Moxon-Browne, "Political Integration in the European Union: Any Lessons for
ASEAN?" in P. Murray, ed., Europe and Asia: Regions in Flux (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008) 84.
17 As Singapore diplomat Tommy Koh puts it, "ASEAN suffers from a serious perception problem... policy-
makers in Washington and Brussels do not take it seriously and continue to disrespect the institution." See
Tommy Koh, "ASEAN at Forty: Perception and Reality" in D. Nair and Lee P.O., eds., Regional Outlook
Southeast Asia, 2008-2009 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2008) at 8. See further, Shaun
Narine, Explaining ASEAN: Regionalism in Southeast Asia (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2002).
18 ASEAN regionalism also has to be considered in light of other Asian regionalisms. The literature on Asian
regionalism is a burgeoning one. Useful primers include N. Tarling, Regionalism in Southeast Asia: To Foster
the Political Will (London: Routledge, 2006), and M. Beeson, supra note 10. See also H. Dieter, ed., The
Evolution of Regionalism in Asia: Economic and Security Issues (London: Routledge, 2007); A. Hurrell,
"One World? Many Worlds? The Place of Regions in the Study of International Society" (2007) 83 Int'l Aff.
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Forum (ARF), the only regular multilateral platform for ASEAN and its stakeholders in the
Asia-Pacific region to discuss security matters. For a region that has tacitly subscribed to the
doctrine of a balance of powers, the fear is real among ASEAN leaders that ASEAN could
become subordinate to external elements within its own backyard.19 ASEAN members
realized, with varying degrees of urgency and commitment, that ASEAN could be eclipsed,
or worse made marginal and irrelevant in East Asian international affairs. 20
Hence, the constant refrain that ASEAN must be "in the driver's seat" and the ASEAN
mantra of "regional solutions to regional problems". Collectively, they seek to minimize
external intervention in Southeast Asia, and for ASEAN to be in-charge of its own destiny
rather than have its destiny and the rules of engagement determined by non-ASEAN play-
ers.2 ' This has been the raison d'6tre of ASEAN. To lose that ownership and leadership in
their own backyard in a rapidly changing geopolitical landscape could mean a significant
loss of control over the destiny of the region, and possibly external intervention in ASEAN
affairs by external powers. To avoid such a scenario, ASEAN has to be sufficiently cohesive
to be a key player in its own right in regional politics, and not be an arena for external
elements to advance their strategic causes in self-interest. Singapore's Defence Minister
summarized the imperative for a broadening and deepening of regional integration within
the larger quest for stability, peace and economic development:
An ASEAN that is diffused and uncoordinated can only lead to a Southeast Asian
region that is eventually fragmented by the stresses and strains triggered by China and
India's rise, and the inter-play of tensions among them and the other major powers.2 2
To that end, ASEAN has to move beyond dialoguing, informal workings, weak commitments
to ASEAN agreements, and inadequate organizational set-up. The drafting of the Charter
was part housekeeping, part aspiration and part goal-setting. It is still a work-in-progress
given that the details over key institutions and processes, such as the human rights body and
the dispute resolution mechanism, still need to be crafted, made workable, and relevant to
key stakeholders. As it enters its fifth decade of existence, ASEAN patently needs to be more
action-driven, organizationally responsive, effective, and cohesive. This entails that member
states dutifully observe the rights and responsibilities of membership. The quest was, and
is, for a more stable, cooperative and robust framework for ASEAN for internal use by
member states as well as for meaningful engagement with external partners. The process of
drawing up the constitution for ASEAN was long overdue. Indeed, ASEAN ought to have
its Charter in place before enlarging its membership to include Myanmar, Laos, Vietnam
and Cambodia. This could have avoided the competing and even conflicting interests, needs,
and motivations in ASEAN matters between the founding and newer members.
127; D. Camroux, "Asia... whose Asia? A 'Return to the Future' of a Sino-Indic Asian Community" (2007)
20 Pac. Rev. 551. But see the analysis that ASEAN regionalism is an illusion and delusion in D.M. Jones and
M.L.R. Smith, ASEAN and East Asian International Relations: Regional Delusion (Northhampton: Edward
Elgar, 2006).
19 See F. Frost, "ASEAN's Regional Cooperation and Multilateral Relations: Recent Developments and Aus-
tralia's Interests", Parliament of Australia Research Paper No. 12 (2008-2009), 9 October 2008. For a succinct
discussion of the security challenges facing ASEAN, see S.W. Simon, ASEAN and its Security Offspring: Facing
New Challenges (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2007).
20 Bill Emmott describes ASEAN's fear as a "collective sentiment of being overshadowed by others: Japan, to
the north-east, the United States, across the Pacific, but above all China, which sits all around their northern
boundaries. Their problem, in other words, is of being small fish in a sea dominated by big ones". See
B. Emmott, Rivals: How the Power Struggle between China, India and Japan will Shape Our Next Decade
(London: Allen Lane, 2008) at 45.
21 See further E. Goh, "Southeast Asian Perspectives on the China Challenge" (2007) 30 J. of Strategic Stud. 809;
A. Collins, "Forming a Security Community: Lessons from ASEAN" (2007) 7 Int'l Relat. Asia-Pac. 203.
22 Enhancing Security in a Time of Flux, speech by Singapore Minister of Defence Teo Chee Hean, Third
Asia-Pacific Security Conference, Singapore, 19 February 2006.
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The formal legal origins of the Charter can be found in the Vientiane Action Programme
(VAP) which was endorsed at the 10th ASEAN Summit in Vientiane on 29 November
2004. ASEAN leaders recognized that to strengthen ASEAN, the development of the Charter
was necessary as part of the overall process of building collective responsibilities and to
have a "common adherence to norms of good conduct". 2 3 At the 11th ASEAN Summit in
December 2005, ASEAN member states adopted the "Kuala Lumpur Declaration on the
Establishment of the ASEAN Charter". 24 The ASEAN collective leadership declared the
following as the objectives of the proposed Charter:
(1) To serve as a legal and institutional framework of ASEAN;
(2) To codify all ASEAN norms, rules, and values;
(3) To reaffirm principles, goals and ideals contained in ASEAN's milestone agree-
ments, viz the ASEAN Declaration (1967), the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation
in Southeast Asia (1976), the Treaty on Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free
Zone (1995), the ASEAN Vision 2020 (1997) and the Declaration of ASEAN
Concord 11 (2003);
(4) To confer upon ASEAN a legal personality, determine the functions, develop areas
of competence of key ASEAN bodies and their relationship with one another in
the overall ASEAN structure.
ASEAN was mindful that the Charter must reaffirm "the principles of inter-state relations
in accordance with the UN Charter and established international law that promote and
protect ASEAN community interests as well as inter-state relations and the national interests
of the individual ASEAN Member Countries". 25 To expedite the process of drafting, the
ASEAN Summit established an Eminent Persons Group (EPG) on the ASEAN Charter in
December 2005, comprising highly distinguished and well-respected citizens from ASEAN
member states, with the mandate "to examine and provide practical recommendations on the
directions and nature of the ASEAN Charter relevant to the ASEAN Community as envisaged
in the Bali CONCORD II and beyond".2 6 The KL Declaration also enabled the ASEAN
Foreign Ministers to subsequently establish a High Level Task Force to carry out the drafting
of the ASEAN Charter. The EPG consulted extensively Track 2 participants and civil society
organizations, many of whom prepared detailed submissions and representations to the
EPG. There was much enthusiasm, and perhaps over-expectation, that the Charter would
be people-centered.
Although the ASEAN Summit endorsed the landmark EPG report at its 12th Summit in
Cebu in January 2007, not all the recommendations were taken on board when the Charter
was finally ready for signing. The EPG had boldly recommended that the Charter provide
for sanctions, such as suspension of a member's rights and privileges and, in "exceptional cir-
cumstances", expulsion from membership. 27 Another recommendation was to have majority
voting in important but less sensitive areas when consensus could not be achieved. 28 Unsur-
prisingly, there were some member states which lobbied to limit the impact and influence of
the EPG report, worried that some of these recommendations would be incorporated into
23 Singapore Minister of Defence Teo Chee Hean, Enhancing Security in a Time of Flux (Speech to the Third
Asia-Pacific Security Conference, Singapore, 19 February 2006).
24 Kuala Lumpur Declaration on the Establishment of the ASEAN Charter, 12 December 2005, online: ASEAN
<http://www.aseansec.org/l 8030.htm>.
25 Ibid.
26 Terms of Reference of the Eminent Persons Group (EPG) on the ASEAN Charter (12-13 December 2005),
online: ASEAN <http://www.aseansec.org/18060.htm>.
27 The Eminent Persons Group on the ASEAN Charter, Report of the Eminent Persons Group on the
ASEAN Charter (Jakarta, December 2006), online, ASEAN <http://www.aseansec.org/19247.pdf>. P.
Chachavalpongpun, ed., The Road to Ratification and Implementation of the ASEAN Charter (Singapore:
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009).
28 Ibid.
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the Charter. 29 The apparent disconnect between the EPG report and the Charter can be
reconciled if we regarded them as representing what is "ideal" and "workable" respectively
for ASEAN. But the EPG, with its bold vision for ASEAN, gave rise to expectantly exuberant
expectations of the Charter. 30 This led to anticipation of a radical Charter. As such, the
disappointment among the civil society activists was natural and to be expected when the
Charter fell far short of the raised expectations.
I. OVERVIEW AND STRATEGIC THRUSTS OF THE ASEAN CHARTER
The Charter, as the constitution of ASEAN, comprises 55 articles in 13 chapters, and
4 annexes. Chapter 1 is a declaratory statement of ASEAN's purposes and principles.
Chapter 2 confers ASEAN legal personality. Chapter 3 deals with membership. Chapter 4
addresses the organs of ASEAN viz the ASEAN Summit, the ASEAN Coordinating Coun-
cil, the ASEAN Community Councils, the ASEAN Sectoral Ministerial Bodies, the office
of the ASEAN Secretary-General and the ASEAN Secretariat, the Committee of Permanent
Representatives to ASEAN, the ASEAN national secretariats, the ASEAN Human Rights
Body, and the ASEAN Foundation. Chapter 5 is concerned with the ASEAN-associated
entities. Chapter 6 covers the immunities and privileges of ASEAN, the Secretary-General
and Secretariat staff, as well as the permanent representatives and officials on ASEAN duties.
Chapter 7 formalizes the decision-making process in ASEAN. The framework for dispute
settlement process and mechanisms is provided for in Chapter 8. ASEAN's budgetary and
finance matters are dealt in Chapter 9, while Chapter 10 covers the organization's adminis-
tration and procedure. Chapter 11 states the identity and symbols of ASEAN. Chapter 12
deals with external relations, with Chapter 13 being concerned with general provisions and
procedures such as ratification, amendments, interpretation of the Charter.
A. Strategic Thrust 1: Formalizing ASEAN as an Institution
The first strategic thrust of the Charter is to formalize ASEAN as an institution by providing it
with the legal and institutional framework. This would also contribute towards streamlining
its decision-making processes. Article 1 of the Charter elaborates on ASEAN's purposes.
It expands the seven "aims and purposes" in the ASEAN Declaration (also known as the
Bangkok Declaration) adopted on 8 August 1967.31 The ASEAN Declaration describes
ASEAN as an "Association for Regional Cooperation". 32 The Charter emphasizes that all
member states have "equal rights and obligations". 33 New members may be admitted by
consensus.
34
In many respects, the Charter does not break new ground. It can be said that the Charter
is generally concerned with formalizing the principles, values, workings of ASEAN. Prior to
the Charter, ASEAN operated on conventions, informal diplomacy, and decision-making
by consensus. The Charter seeks to formalize these practices. The institutionalization of
ASEAN as an organization is an important aspect of it having legal personality. More
29 "Way paved for ASEAN makeover" Sunday Times, (14 January 2007).
30 See, generally, T. Koh, R.G. Manalo, and W. Woon, eds., The Making of the ASEAN Charter (Singapore:
World Scientific, 2009). See also D. Seah, "The ASEAN Charter" (2009) 58 I.C.L.Q. 197.
31 The ASEAN Declaration, done in Bangkok, 8 August 1967, online: ASEAN <http://www.aseansec.org/
1212.htm>.
32 Ibid.
33 ASEAN Charter, supra note 2, art. 5(1).
31 See generally ibid., art. 6. Timor-Leste is a potential member of ASEAN. It acceded to ASEAN's Treaty of
Amity and Cooperation in 2007. In May 2008, President Jose Ramos-Horta stated that his country hoped to
be able to join ASEAN by 2012.
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importantly, the institutionalization of ASEAN can be regarded as the institutionalization
of the ASEAN process, or more popularly known as the "ASEAN Way". The core of the
ASEAN Way can be found in Article 2 (see further discussion below).
Article 3 pointedly declares "ASEAN, as an inter-governmental organization, is hereby
conferred legal personality". 3s Giving ASEAN a definitive legal personality also helps clarify
the purposes and principles that undergird the organization. It provides ASEAN with a
legal framework, crystallizing long-standing practices into formal ones with legal backing.
It also provides ASEAN with a much needed organizational framework and certainty, with
the potential to enhance ASEAN's effectiveness. However, as Simon Chesterman reminds
us, "personality at the international level is not so much a status as a capacity. It matters
less what you claim than what you do". 36
To be sure, the Charter is not meant to make ASEAN a legalistic organization, but rather
one that is rule-based. At least, this is the aspiration given that ASEAN's "problem is
one of ensuring compliance and effective implementation". 37 Singapore's Foreign Minis-
ter George Yeo attributed ASEAN's problem of implementation to ASEAN's lack of "legal
basis" and there being "too many escape hatches". 38 Only about 30 per cent of ASEAN's
agreements and commitments have been honoured and implemented. 39 ASEAN's immedi-
ate past Secretary-General had said that, "It is unclear what is the legal status of ASEAN
agreements within the national law of each member country. What is clear is that violation
of ASEAN agreements seldom pains the guilty party. But it certainly hurts ASEAN as a
whole" .40
In the first twenty-five years of ASEAN's existence, the focus of ASEAN was primarily
internal. However, with the end of the Cold War and greater integration taking place across
the globe as a result of globalization and expanded commerce, ASEAN's orientation has to
be increasingly geared to the external environment. Chapter 12 of the Charter stipulates
the operating paradigm for the conduct of ASEAN's external relations. In particular, the
Charter provides the necessary impetus for ASEAN as the driver in Southeast Asia. Arti-
cle 41(3) declares that "ASEAN shall be the primary driving force in regional arrangements
that it initiates and maintain its centrality in regional cooperation and community build-
ing". It urges ASEAN member states "on the basis of unity and solidarity" to "coordinate
and endeavour to develop common positions and joint actions". 4' The ASEAN Summit,
upon the recommendation of ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting, shall set the "strategic
policy directions" in ASEAN's external relations. 42 The Charter also empowers ASEAN to
conclude agreements with countries, regional and international organizations. 4 3
"Legalizing" ASEAN is seen as a definitive way of making ASEAN a legal entity in its
own right. It clarifies that ASEAN is not an informal family grouping of Southeast Asian
nation-states but one that has status under international law as well as domestic laws within
member states, and can make agreements in its own right. To be sure, ASEAN had always
existed even if it lacked a legal enabling clause on its existence. For instance, ASEAN's role
3S For a discussion of what ASEAN's legal personality does or does not do, see S. Chesterman, "Does ASEAN
Exist? The Association of Southeast Asian Nations as an International Legal Person" (2008) 12 S.Y.B.I.L.
199.
36 Ibid., at 14. Emphasis in original.
37 Report of the Eminent Persons Group on the ASEAN Charter, supra note 27, para. 44 at 6.
38 Straits Times (27 July 2007).
39 Speech by Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, 41st ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, 21 July 2008,
Singapore.
40 Ong Keng Yong, "ASEAN: Challenges in the 21st Century" (Speech in the SI|A Forum Series 2006, delivered
at Hwa Chong Institution, 29 June 2006).
41 ASEAN Charter, supra note 2, art. 41(4).
42 The ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting is responsible for ensuring "consistency and coherence in the conduct
of ASEAN's external relations". See ibid., art. 41(5)-(6).
43 Ibid., art. 41(7).
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and standing as a convenor, facilitator and regional architect of key East Asian and Asia-
Pacific intergovernmental organizations and forum such as the ASEAN Regional Forum
(ARF), Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and the East Asia Summit (EAS) was
never in doubt even though it had no de jure legal personality.
However, ASEAN's "problem is not legal personality but a shared vision of the purpose
of that existence, of its place in the world"." The Charter is conceived to help give ASEAN
a sense of renewed purpose. Yet, shared purpose is real only if political will exists on that
score among the member states. Clothing ASEAN with rules, as the Charter does, is the
easy part. The harder part is whether the legal personality is meaningful and relevant to
its stakeholders within and outside the region. Whether the Charter makes ASEAN a more
rules-based and relevant organization remains to be seen. Here, action will speak louder
than words.
With ASEAN acquiring a legal personality, it also acquires a formal decision-making
capacity and contracting capacity in the international arena. This is important for countries
and international organizations seeking to enter into formal relationships with ASEAN.
Previously, it was not entirely clear that in negotiating with ASEAN, ASEAN was speaking
authoritatively in one voice, or there was a cacophony of ten voices-some louder than
others. Nevertheless, even with a legal personality, one should not expect ASEAN members
to act in unison on all matters at all times, especially controversial issues. As Dunne observes
of the European Union (EU), the expectation of complete agreement is unrealistic even in
the EU's context:
... [H]aving agency does not mean the union will be able to mobilize a common
position at all times. Indeed, the likelihood of this occurring has been reduced by
the process of enlargement to a more numerous group in which consensus is harder
to achieve and where the gap between the more powerful and the weaker members
(especially when it comes to military capability) is enormous. 45
Whether ASEAN will be a mere collective of Southeast Asian nation-states or whether it
will rise to be a moral and political agent will remain central to its raison d'tre. This
distinction is vital if ASEAN is to be relevant intra-regionally and a player in regional
and international affairs. Dunne puts it well: "a moral agent possesses an identity that
is more than an aggregate of the identities of its parts; and the collective agent has a
decision-making capacity". 4 6 It is perhaps not too far-fetched to suggest that the Charter is
a measure of self-help in regional integration as part of ASEAN's gradual development,
in response to internal and external factors, and to help entrench ASEAN sovereignty.
To be sure, much work remains to be done to clothe it with substance and ensure that
ASEAN's collective sovereignty is distinct and separate from that of its constituent member
states.
B. Strategic Thrust 2: Strengthening ASEAN Institutions
The Charter identifies the key constituent organs and states their roles and responsibilities
viz the ASEAN Summit, the ASEAN Coordinating Council, the ASEAN Community Coun-
cils, the ASEAN Sectoral Ministerial Bodies, the ASEAN Secretary-General, the ASEAN
Secretariat, the Committee of Permanent Representatives to ASEAN, the ASEAN National
Secretariats, the ASEAN Human Rights Body, and the ASEAN Foundation. The Charter
44 Chesterman, supra note 35. See also L. Hsu, "Towards an ASEAN Charter: Some Thought from the Legal
Perspective" in R.C. Severino, ed., Framing the ASEAN Charter: An ISEAS Perspective (Singapore: Institute
of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005) at 45.
45 T. Dunne, "Good Citizen Europe" (2008) 84 Int'l Aff. 13 at 19.
46 Ibid. It should be noted that ASEAN, even post-Charter, is not modeled on the EU.
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vests the ASEAN Summit, comprising the Heads of State or Government of member states,
with the authority of the supreme policy-making body of ASEAN. 47 Its wide-ranging pow-
ers include deliberating and providing policy guidance, 48 addressing emergency situations
affecting ASEAN, 4 9 deciding on matters referred to it in connection with a serious breach or
non-compliance of the Charter,5 0 and dealing with unresolved disputes.5 l The Summit also
appoints the ASEAN Secretary-General upon the recommendation of the ASEAN Foreign
Ministers Meeting.5 2 The Charter provides for the Summit to meet twice annually and to be
convened as and when necessary. s3 The Summit is supported by the ASEAN Coordinating
Council comprising the Foreign Ministers of member states.5 4 To further the cause of estab-
lishing the ASEAN Community by 2015, the Charter provides for the establishment of three
ASEAN Community Councils.5 5 The ASEAN Community is the umbrella nomenclature
incorporating the three pillars (or constituent sub-communities) viz the ASEAN Political-
Security Community, the ASEAN Economic Community, and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural
Community. In turn, each of the three Community Councils oversees the relevant ASEAN
Sectoral Ministerial Bodies.5
6
The Charter also beefs up the office of the Secretary-General and the ASEAN Secretariat.
The Secretary-General, who shall be accorded the rank and status of Minister, is also the
chief administrative officer of ASEAN. 57 The Secretary-General serves a non-renewable five-
year term of office.5 8 In recognition of the workload and to ensure better administrative
support to superior ASEAN organs, the Charter provides for four (previously two) Deputy
Secretaries-Generals, with the rank and status of Deputy Ministers.5 9 They shall be of
different nationalities from the Secretary-General and shall come from four different member
states.
60
The Charter also specifically states that the Secretary-General and the Secretariat staff
are tasked with "exclusively ASEAN character" responsibilities. 61  As such, member
states are required to respect their independence and not "seek to influence them" in
the discharge of their responsibilities. 62  The Charter also requires them to be apoliti-
cal and professional, and always "uphold the highest standards of integrity, efficiency,
and competence" in the execution of their duties. 63 To better ensure that ASEAN's offi-
cials are able to carry their work effectively, the Charter provides for immunities and
privileges for ASEAN, the Secretary-General, the Secretariat staff, the Permanent Rep-
resentatives to ASEAN, and officials of member states participating in official ASEAN
activities. 64
47 ASEAN Charter, supra note 2, art. 7(2)(a).
41 Ibid., art. 7(2)(b).
49 Ibid., art. 7(2)(d).
50 Ibid., c. 7.
s Ibid., c. 8.
52 Ibid., art. 7(2)(g).
53 Ibid., art. 7(3)(a) & (b).
54 Ibid., art. 8.
55 Ibid., art. 9. See also Declaration of ASEAN Concord 11, 24 February 1976, online, ASEAN < http://www.
aseansec.org/1216.htm > [Bali Declaration]. On the Bali Declaration and its potential to reform ASEAN, see
K. Freistein, "ASEAN after the Bali Summit 2003: From Paralysis to New Life?" (2005) 4 Eur. J. E. Asian
Stud. 177.
56 Ibid., ASEAN Charter, arts. 9(2) and 10, and Annex 1.
57 Ibid., arts. 7(2)(g) and 11(3).
58 Ibid., art. 11(1).
59 Ibid., art. 11(4).
60 Ibid., art. 11(5).
61 Ibid., art. 11(9).
62 Ibid.
63 Ibid., art. 11(8)(a).
64 Ibid., arts. 17, 18 and 19.
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The Charter states that the ASEAN Secretariat shall be provided with the "necessary
financial resources to perform its functions effectively". 6s To better align ASEAN and
the Secretariat with its member states, the Charter also requires members to appoint
ambassadorial-rank Permanent Representatives to ASEAN resident in Jakarta where the
ASEAN Secretariat is located. Collectively, the ten Permanent Representatives shall con-
stitute the Committee of Permanent Representatives. 66 Member states are also required to
establish their ASEAN national secretariats to serve as the focal point of ASEAN in member
states, coordinate the implementation of ASEAN decisions nationally and promote ASEAN
identity and awareness as well. 67 In addition, the Charter provides for the establishment of
an ASEAN human rights body, and the ASEAN Foundation.
68
The description of the various ASEAN organs in the ASEAN Charter represents an
attempt to overcome the valid criticism of institutional frailty. It attempts to put in place
an organizational framework to help facilitate and coordinate the numerous activities and
meetings under the auspices of ASEAN. They seek to provide ASEAN with the resources
to further its objectives, and to enhance the institutionalization of the ASEAN framework.
Chapter 5 of the Charter is primarily concerned with the formalization of the dealings with
various organs, which hitherto had engaged with ASEAN with the permission of its relevant
bodies. As ASEAN members still value institutional flexibility, the Charter discusses the
mandates of the various organs without undue specificity, giving them the necessary room
for flexible growth and development and yet achieve disciplined organizational work and
purpose.
69
The Charter does not unequivocally address the issue of dealing with the member states'
differential capacity of integration. Given its consensual decision-making convention, this
often means decisions based on the lowest common denominator. While useful in the
fledgling days of ASEAN, this mode of decision-making is unduly restrictive and contains
severe, inherent weaknesses. The original members took the position that the pace of inte-
gration should not be set by the slowest member. Hence, in the last few years especially
in economic matters, a flexible approach towards the implementation or "flexible partici-
pation" has been taken. Two approaches commonly used are "2+X" and "ASEAN minus
X". This enables member states which are ready to proceed first. The former has a lower
threshold and only requires two member states which are ready; those who are not ready can
join in when they are ready. Similarly, in the "ASEAN minus X" approach, the focus is not
on unanimity. Rather, the core idea is that no member should hold back the group. Either
approach can help economic negotiations proceed without undue delay. ASEAN member
states are aware of their different capacities, priorities and perspectives towards economic
and political integration.
Although Article 217o provides for a flexible, two-tiered approach in economic matters,
that approach has also been ingenuously applied in non-economic matters. For instance,
ASEAN proceeded with implementing the Charter without waiting for all member states to
ratify it. The 41st ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, which was held in Singapore in July 2008,
started work on the Charter viz the dispute settlement mechanism under Article 2571 and the
65 There are, nonetheless, constraints on the ASEAN Secretariat. One is the continuation of the practice of equal
financial contributions by member states, rather than a sliding scale of contributions like in the United Nations.
See ibid., ASEAN Charter, art. 30(2).
66 Ibid., art. 12.
67 Ibid., art. 13.
68 Ibid., arts. 14 and 15. See pp. 182-85 below for further discussion on the ASEAN human rights body.
69 This seems to be tack taken in many Asian inter-governmental organizations, see M. Kahler, "Legalization as
Strategy: The Asia-Pacific case" (2000) 54 Int'l Org. 549. See further, E. Solingen, "The Genesis, Design and
Effects of Regional Institutions: Lessons from East Asia and the Middle East" (2008) 52 Int'l Stud. Q. 261.
70 ASEAN Cbarter, supra note 2, art. 21.
71 Ibid., art. 25.
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drafting of the terms of reference for the ASEAN Human Rights Body under Article 14.72
There is an emerging discourse that the "all-or-nothing" approach will not benefit mem-
ber states and ASEAN. The shift towards flexible participation and implementation that
is inclusive is discernible and is indicative of a nuanced re-calibration of the consensus
approach.
What the Charter does is to facilitate the basic institutionalization and strengthening of
the institutions of ASEAN. This can also help manage the danger of a bifurcated ASEAN
in which member states are operating at two different speeds, where the gap between the
original and new members is in constant danger of becoming a chasm that can leave ASEAN
bereft of principle and purpose. This is the approach taken in two controversial topics: the
regional human rights mechanism in ASEAN, and the relationship between Myanmar and
ASEAN (discussed in Section IIIB below).
1. ASEAN and human rights: Mutually exclusive?
The issue of human rights is a controversial topic in ASEAN. Even so, the provision for
a human rights mechanism in ASEAN in the Charter is a significant milestone in the life
and times of ASEAN. The state of democratic development and commitment to democ-
racy and rule of law varies from member state to member state. In the international fora,
ASEAN is seen as an outlier, primarily because of its (in)action towards Myanmar. Nonethe-
less, ASEAN is sensitive to and cognizant of international concerns and developments on
human rights. The first indication that ASEAN, as a grouping, was prepared to "consider
the establishment of an appropriate regional mechanism on human rights" was in 1993. 73
ASEAN's position on human rights was clearly enunciated following the World Conference
on Human Rights in Vienna that year. The careful wording of the joint communiqu6 by the
26th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in 1993 was evident and deliberate:
16. The Foreign Ministers welcomed the international consensus achieved during the
World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna, 14-25 June 1993, and reaffirmed
ASEAN's commitment to and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms
as set out in the Vienna Declaration of 25 June 1993. They stressed that human
rights are interrelated and indivisible comprising civil, political, economic, social and
cultural rights. These rights are of equal importance. They should be addressed in
a balanced and integrated manner and protected and promoted with due regard for
specific cultural, social, economic and political circumstances. They emphasized that
the promotion and protection of human rights should not be politicized.
17. The Foreign Ministers agreed that ASEAN should coordinate a common approach
on human rights and actively participate and contribute to the application, promo-
tion and protection of human rights. They noted that the UN Charter had placed the
question of universal observance and promotion of human rights within the context of
international cooperation. They stressed that development is an inalienable right and
that the use of human rights as a conditionality for economic cooperation and devel-
opment assistance is detrimental to international cooperation and could undermine
an international consensus on human rights. They emphasized that the protection
and promotion of human rights in the international community should take cog-
nizance of the principles of respect for national sovereignty, territorial integrity and
non-interference in the internal affairs of states. They were convinced that freedom,
progress and national stability are promoted by a balance between the rights of the
72 Ibid., art. 14.
73 Joint Communiqug of the Twenty-Sixth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Singapore, 23-24 July 1993, online:
ASEAN <http://www.aseansec.org/2009.htm>.
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individual and those of the community, through which many individual rights are
realized, as provided for in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
18. The Foreign Ministers reviewed with satisfaction the considerable and continuing
progress of ASEAN in freeing its peoples from fear and want, enabling them to live
in dignity. They stressed that the violations of basic human rights must be redressed
and should not be tolerated under any pretext. They further stressed the importance
of strengthening international cooperation on all aspects of human rights and that
all governments should uphold humane standards and respect human dignity. In this
regard and in support of the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action of 25
June 1993, they agreed that ASEAN should also consider the establishment of an
appropriate regional mechanism on human rights.
74
In essence, ASEAN's position on human rights can be summarized as follows75:
(1) The equality, inter-relatedness and indivisibility of civil, political, economic, social
and cultural rights.
(2) The promotion of human rights must take into account the specific cultural,
social, economic and political circumstances, and in the context of development and
international cooperation.
(3) The rejection of the politicization of human rights, including its use as a precedent
condition for economic cooperation and development assistance.
(4) The promotion and protection of human rights must respect the national
sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference in the internal affairs of states.
(5) The balance of individual rights and community rights.
Article 1(7) of the Charter states that one of ASEAN's purpose is to "strengthen democracy,
enhance good governance and the rule of law, and to promote and protect human rights
and fundamental freedoms, with due regard to the rights and responsibilities of the Member
States of ASEAN". 76 The Charter, however, does not give full effect to this aspiration in any
significant manner. Article 14 merely states that "ASEAN shall establish an ASEAN human
rights body". 77 This body "shall operate in accordance with the terms of reference to be
determined by the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting". 78 At the foreign ministers level,
they agreed to such a provision being included in the Charter although Myanmar (earlier,
Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam) objected to such a body. Singapore's Foreign Minister noted
the disagreement on the nature the ASEAN human rights organization should take. How-
ever, he assured Singapore parliamentarians that the body "will not be a toothless paper
tiger" :79
Some ASEAN countries prefer a body which has no teeth because there is justifiable
concern that Western countries and NGOs will make use of it to interfere in their
74 Ibid.
75 See also Thio L.A., "Implementing Human Rights in ASEAN Countries: Promises to Keep and Miles to go
before I Sleep" (1999) 2 Yale Hum. Rts. & Dev. L.J 1. See generally A.J. Langlois, The Politics of Justice
and Human Rights: Southeast Asia and Universalist Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
76 ASEAN Charter, supra note 2, art. 1(7).
77 Ibid., art. 14.
78 As expected, human rights was a key area of disagreement among ASEAN members in the draft Charter. See
"ASEAN divided over regional charter" Financial Times-Asia (31 July 2007) 2. See also the efforts by the
regional civil society Working Group for an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism. The Group's primary goal
is to establish a regional human rights commission for ASEAN. For more details, see online: <http://www.
aseanhrmech.org>.
79 Remarks in Singapore Parliament during Committee of Supply debate, 28 February 2008.
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domestic politics. Others make the opposite argument, that a credible human rights
body will help us address this issue on our own terms. It is precisely because of a
lack of agreement among ASEAN countries that the human rights body was called a
'body' and not a 'commission'. My own guess is that we will have in the end a body
which, while lacking in teeth, will at least have a tongue and a tongue will have its
uses.
80
Given the varying human rights record of ASEAN member states, ASEAN itself also suffers
from a credibility gap in that it is unable to assertively and resolutely defend human rights
by example and through advocacy. There is also the issue of what the core human rights
in ASEAN should be. Although Article 1481 may not go as far as it ought, the dynamics at
work making the human rights body a sensitive topic should not be ignored either. At heart
is the concern among some member states that the human rights body would be a segue for
intervention by external parties in the internal affairs of a member state. Indeed, the die
has been cast in that human rights have acquired recognition by the ASEAN leadership as
an important issue that cannot be wished away.82 Clearly, ASEAN members now have to
deal with the issue of human rights within member states and with ASEAN collectively. As
Singapore's Straits Times editorialized, "The definition of that core has to be enlightened
enough to maintain a steady pressure on member states, and practical enough so as not to
be deemed an irrelevance". 83 More than just defining the core of human rights, the human
rights body must have a viable reporting and monitoring mechanism, and be independent
like other regional human rights commissions in Africa and Latin America. It may well be
that the Charter and ASEAN will invariably be judged on their commitment to the issue of
human rights. This, unfortunately, would be short-sighted but it is a matter that ASEAN
would have to be cognizant of if it seeks to enhance its dealings with the US and the EU.
The principle of non-interference is a possible stumbling block. If this principle is given
de facto overriding veto effect, then the Charter and ASEAN will be rendered toothless in
this area of growing importance. Too often, critics fail to appreciate that even if ASEAN is
not up to mark in this regard, it would be foolish and short-sighted to throw the proverbial
baby (i.e. ASEAN) out with the bath water (i.e. the Charter). To expect the military junta
in Myanmar and other member states to improve overnight and have flawless human rights
record on account of the Charter smacks of unrealism. As Simon Tay observes, "The hard
truth is that the international community does not easily deal with any country that willfully
disregards norms." 84 North Korea, Sudan, Iran, and Israel are some other examples.
Instead, what the world community should be looking out for is whether ASEAN pos-
sesses the commitment, will, and gumption to take recalcitrant member states to task, even
if this is done incrementally. The life and experience of international politics will be familiar
with the distinction between form and substance. On either count, ASEAN still needs to be
able to stand up to scrutiny. Requiring member states, through the Charter, to pull them-
selves up by their boot-straps sends a strong signal and sets the stage for concrete action
even if this is juxtaposed with incremental change.
The challenge of giving effect to the protection of human rights in ASEAN is real. Because
of their supposed universality, a genuine human rights regime would potentially supersede
state sovereignty so cherished by ASEAN member states, and would potentially undermine
80 Ibid.
81 ASEAN Charter, supra note 2, art. 14.
82 H.E.S. Nesadurai, "ASEAN and Regional Governance after the Cold War? From Regional Order to Regional
Community?" (2009) 22 Pac. Rev. 91; R. Burchill, "Regional Integration and the Promotion and Protec-
tion of Democracy in Asia: Lessons from ASEAN" (2007) 13 Asian Y. B. Int'l L. 51. On the relationship
between multilateralism and democracy, see R.Ohane, S. Macedo, and A. Moravcsik, "Democracy-Enhancing
Multilateralism" (2009) 63 Int'l Org. 1.
83 "ASEAN is maturing" Straits Times (1 August 2007).
84 S. Tay, "ASEAN's Charter: Promises vs. Realities" Today [of Singaporel (2-3 August 2008).
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the non-interference principle in ASEAN as well.8" Thus, it is to be expected that ASEAN
is treading very cautiously on the human rights body. The concern is that the human rights
body becomes a Trojan horse by which human rights is admitted to the domestic and regional
agenda, with member states losing the prerogative and control of the human rights debate
domestically and regionally.
Allied to this is the emergence of the putative "responsibility to protect" (R2P) norm in
humanitarian law. At the basic level, R2P requires a sovereign government to protect its
people from mass atrocity crimes (e.g. ethnic cleansing, genocide). However, if the govern-
ment is unable or unwilling to do so, then a wider responsibility lies with the international
community to take the requisite action necessary to assist preventively, and if required, react
effectively. This is the responsibility of all states. R2P focuses on assistance and prevention
as well as non-military action before, during, and after a crisis. Use of force, specifically mil-
itary intervention, is a last-resort option but only with the United Nations Security Council's
endorsement. 86 This emergent international norm adds pressure on ASEAN to intervene,
when necessary, when an ASEAN member state is unable or unwilling to protect the welfare
of its people in the event of a mass atrocity crime. 87
C. Strategic Thrust 3: Establishing Formal Mechanisms to Monitor Compliance
and Settle Disputes
The settlement of disputes is provided for in Chapter 8 of the Charter. The Charter exhorts
member states to "resolve peacefully all disputes in a timely manner through dialogue, con-
sultation and negotiation". 88 Prior to the Charter, dispute resolution was most advanced
in the economic realm primarily through the 2004 ASEAN Protocol on Enhanced Dis-
pute Resolution Mechanism ("the Vientiane Protocol"). The Charter requires that ASEAN
establish and maintain dispute resolution mechanisms in all fields of ASEAN cooperation. 89
Where it is not provided for, the Charter stipulates that "appropriate dispute settlement
mechanisms" be established. 90 In an affirmation of a peaceful and conciliatory approach
to dispute resolution, the Charter urges disputing parties "to resort to good offices, concil-
iation or mediation" to resolve their disputes.9 1 The ASEAN Chairman and the ASEAN
Secretary-General are specifically to provide "good offices, conciliation or mediation" if
requested by the disputing parties. 92
The ASEAN Summit is the final arbiter if a dispute remains unresolved after prior pre-
scribed dispute settlement efforts. 93 Many questions hang over this prescribed process of
dispute resolution. As mentioned earlier, given ASEAN's preference and practice of consen-
sus and agreement, such an open-ended role and discretion given to the ASEAN Summit is
highly unsatisfactory. It may well be that consultation, compromise, and consensus remains
the bedrock of dispute resolution in ASEAN even under the Charter. If so, then the ASEAN
85 The Kantians would also argue that a human rights regime can bring us closer to the state of perpetual peace.
86 See further Gareth Evans, The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and For All
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2008). R2P was adopted at the UN World Summit in 2005.
87 See the dismal prospects for R2P in ASEAN in N.M. Morada, "The ASEAN Charter and the Promotion of
R2P in Southeast Asia: Challenges and Constraints" (2009) 1 Glob. Resp. to Prot. 185.
88 ASEAN Charter, supra note 2, art. 22(1).
11 Ibid., art. 22(2). Art. 24(3) of the Charter reiterates the centrality of the Vientiane Protocol as a key mode of
dispute resolution in ASEAN economic agreements.
90 Ibid., ASEAN Charter, art. 25. This allows ASEAN to create a formal regional court in future should litigation
be seen as an appropriate mode of dispute resolution in certain conflicts.
91 Ibid. art. 23(1).
92 Ibid., art. 23(2).
93 Ibid., art. 26.
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Summit itself is likely to try to resolve the dispute. If it is unsuccessful, the ASEAN Sum-
mit would most likely refer that unresolved dispute to international arbitration in the first
instance, or even direct parties to the International Court of Justice at the Hague.
Article 27 seeks to further the objective of making ASEAN more rules-based and effective
in terms of managing the outcomes after a dispute has been resolved. The Secretary-General
is tasked with the responsibility to monitor the compliance with the findings, recommenda-
tions or decisions of an ASEAN dispute settlement mechanism. 94 It also provides that the
aggrieved party affected by the non-compliance may refer the matter to the ASEAN Sum-
mit.95 A fair criticism of Chapter 8 of the Charter is that there is no meaningful enforcement
mechanism provided for under the Charter, unless the ASEAN Summit takes upon itself, as
a matter of principle, the role of enforcer. Even then, the lack of such a clearly delineated
legal power is problematic.
A related criticism is that there is no provision in the Charter for sanctions in the event of
a serious breach of Charter or non-compliance. No expulsion or suspension of membership
is provided for in the Charter. While it can be argued that the Charter does not specifically
preclude such extreme measures of suspension of or expulsion from membership, the lack
of such a clear provision suggests that ASEAN is keeping steadfastly to its family approach,
as well as keeping faith to its long-standing cardinal principle of non-interference. Long
used to a glaring lack of an enforcement culture and institutional inertia, ASEAN's intended
transformation from a "family club" to a rules-based organization is now showing up the
heavy path dependence and long-standing inadequacies of its first forty years of existence.
For ASEAN, a transformation is too revolutionary and an evolution is more realistic and
achievable.
Yet the question persists whether ASEAN is changing fast enough, and whether the Char-
ter lacks teeth in dealing with recalcitrant member states. Critics have regularly pounced
on this open-ended, informal, less-than-definitive mode of dispute resolution. However, we
should look at the substantive outcomes rather than the means of dispute resolution. 96 If
resolution is arrived, peace is maintained and the disputing parties' substantive rights are
not infringed upon, why begrudge the means if they are successful? In the process, cer-
tain putative norms and principles could acquire credence and legitimacy and could then
subsequently be incorporated into the Charter.
97
III. THE HYBRID CHARTER: HARD LAW COMPLEXION WITH SOFT-LAW EFFECT
A key argument in this article is that the Charter should not be seen as an agreement cast in
stone. Considering the change in organizational tack that ASEAN sought, ASEAN needed a
Charter that would make this transition feasible through securing the buy-in of all member
states. In other words, the Charter is a pragmatic response to the needs of the organization
that has remained in danger of irrelevance. It is an attempt at organizational re-building
as well as institutionalizing the values, norms and desired practices. Given ASEAN's back-
ground, the Charter plausibly offers a viable way forward for the organization. ASEAN can
either have a Charter observed more in its breach or opt for a Charter that can gradually
inculcate in member states the need to depart, where necessary, from the outmoded aspects
of the ASEAN Way. The Charter codifies long-standing principles, norms, and values as an
integral process of ASEAN's raising the bar on institutional performance and effectiveness.
94 Ibid., art. 27(1).
95 Ibid., art. 27(2).
96 See also W. Woon, "The ASEAN Charter Dispute Settlement Mechanisms" in T. Koh, R.G. Manalo and W.
Woon, eds., The Making of the ASEAN Charter (Singapore: World Scientific, 2009) at 69.
97 The dispute settlement procedure under the Charter did not get off to a good start. In the Preah Vihear
temple dispute, although ASEAN foreign ministers offered ASEAN's facilities at the disposal of Thailand and
Cambodia, neither disputing parry took up the offer.
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Although the Charter is formally "hard law", it is more "soft law" in posture, approach
and effect. The Charter provides ASEAN with the hardware-a putative architecture for
governance and a light-touch regulation. However, the Charter is not a typical "command
and control" legal instrument; it may strike some as more of a non-binding code of conduct,
organizational guidelines rather than a rule-book or constitution. It is submitted that the
Charter should be viewed as a composite legal instrument: ostensibly hard law for its binding
effect and its intent to create a viable organizational and governance structure. Yet it is has
salient soft law elements in its treatment of the key organizational and ideational issues.
A similar approach can be seen in the Charter's effort to crystallize and embody desired
norms, values, and encourage certain patterns of conduct. A case can be made that the
Charter also endows ASEAN with the software and attitudinal mindset of encouraging
member states to imbibe the desired values, adopt the desired conduct so as to facilitate the
attainment of the purposes and principles of ASEAN. The development of the Charter was
seen as one of the strategies for the "shaping and sharing of norms" in the Vientiane Action
Programme. 9
8
In the area of governance in the realm of international affairs and law, the use of hard law
has been the main mode of legalization. However, increasingly, soft law has been adopted
as a complementary mode of legalization. Hard law is generally understood as "legally
binding obligations that are precise (or can be made precise through adjudication or the
issuance of detailed regulations) and that delegate authority for interpreting and implement-
ing the law". 99 Domestic legislation and international treaties are the tangible expressions
of hard law. For example, international agreements and treaties stipulate-in varying
degrees of clarity and precision-the legally-binding duties and obligations (accountability
and compliance), and the punishment for transgression and non-compliance (sanctions).
However, given that the change sought within ASEAN is ideational at its core and incre-
mental in approach, the structural power of hard law, if given full effect, is not only
reactionary but also grossly inadequate as a means of adaptive socialization and social
learning for some member states. Hence, hard law alone cannot make ASEAN a rules-
based, effective and relevant inter-governmental organization. A blind application of hard
law is merely a formalistic and coercive attempt at symptomatic treatment for ASEAN's
shortcomings. It certainly is not a silver bullet for the evolutionary but substantive changes
deemed necessary to raise ASEAN's profile, effectiveness and relevance.
On the other hand, soft law is less definitive and often does not create enforceable rights
and duties. Soft law includes a variety of processes that attempt to set rules, guidelines,
or codes of conduct that share the common trait of having non-legally binding normative
content that may have actual regulative, practical effects similar to hard law.100 Soft law's
inherent flexibility and potential discursive power can facilitate the setting of normative
standards and enable social learning. This is particularly useful in situations where persua-
sion and reflexive adjustment, rather than rigid adherence or enforcement, are needed. In
particular, soft law can assist in efforts to internalize the norms embedded in hard law.'0 1
For instance, the ideational standards or expectations first enunciated in soft law mecha-
nisms can subsequently form the basis on which the practical application of the hard law
can subsequently acquire effectiveness, efficacy, and legitimacy. In the same way, the values
promoted by ASEAN have a better chance of being institutionalized and acquiring buy-in
from member states than by imposing them by fiat or coercion.
98 Vientane Action Programme, supra note 23, para. 1.2 at 7.
99 K.W. Abbott and D. Snidal, "Hard and Soft Law in International Governance" in J.L. Goldstein, M. Kahler,
R.O. Keohane and A-M Slaughter, eds., Legalization and World Politics (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001) at 37.
100 As such, it cannot be relied upon as a basis for deterrence, enforcement action and punitive sanctions.
101 D.M. Trubeck, P. Cottrell and M. Nance, "'Soft Law', 'Hard Law' and EU Integration" in G. de Bdirca and
J. Scott, eds., Law and New Governance in the EU and the US (Oxford: Hart, 2006) at 65.
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Soft law can also be understood as law in the embryonic stage of formation-a precursor
of emerging hard law, principles and norms that might eventually consolidate to become
legally binding rules themselves. As such, soft law can contribute to the legal interpretation
of hard law. In this regard, soft law can help knowledge, norms and values to be framed
strategically and dovetail with existing normative frameworks. Specifically, soft law mecha-
nisms can be adapted for the purposes of persuading ASEAN members of the importance of
the norms that the Charter seek to promote, concretize and give effect to. In ASEAN's con-
text, this means the member states can use soft law attributes to attract, socialize and co-opt
other member states on the imperative of observing the Charter as a means to and an end of
preserving regional peace, stability and progress. These attributes of soft law may facilitate
the socialization, the formation of consensual knowledge and a shared understanding of the
way forward for ASEAN in terms of the desired norms, practices, and values.
The utility of a soft law approach is its transformative capacity in socializing stakeholders
through a consensual and confidence-building process. More directly, soft law speaks to
reason, understanding, strives to develop consensus, and encourage the internalization of
desired values and interests. Soft law's iterative, quasi-prescriptive nature can engage cogni-
tive and informed responses. In contrast, hard law approaches tend to elicit reasoning and
responses that are primarily egocentric, denominated in self-centered terms of punishment-
avoidance, compliance with an authority, and group norms. Soft law approaches encourage
the movement towards a level of conduct that factors the interests of affected parties based
on impartial and reasonable principles. When successfully imbibed, soft law approaches
result in actors adopting critical and reflective reasoning. 102 This, in turn, would result in
more compliance.
A. Tweaking Common Values
The reconfiguration of ASEAN and community building cannot be achieved solely by a
mechanical construction of institutions. Institutional building is not about organizational
architecture per se but needs to be complemented by a subscription to a core of common
values. Common values give added meaning to the organizational architecture, and help
bind the organization. The common values of ASEAN are found in Article 2 titled "Princi-
ples". The Charter recognizes, given ASEAN's diversity, respect for the different cultures,
languages, and religions, while emphasizing "common values in the spirit of unity in diver-
sity". 10 3 The majority of the common values such as sovereignty, collective responsibility,
renunciation of the use of force, peaceful settlement of disputes, adherence to rule of law,
good governance, democratic principles and constitutional government are not problematic
as they are in accord with universal values. To be sure, mere recognition of such values
and norms is one thing but observing and living up to those values meaningfully is another
matter altogether.
The Charter enshrines the so-called ASEAN Way of non-interference in the internal
affairs. As such, it advocates enhanced consultations on matters that seriously affect
ASEAN's common interests, and consensual decision-making. These values have been often
criticized for the excesses found in some ASEAN member states, particularly those with
autocratic regimes. ASEAN's supposed complicity in turning a blind eye to the Myanmar
excesses is a major source of grievance for ASEAN's critics. While this article does not make
a defence of the constituent ingredients of the ASEAN Way, one should not be too hasty to
regard their inclusion as a blatant codification of problematic values and norms.
102 See generally Goldstein et al., supra note 99.
103 ASEAN Charter, supra note 2, art. 2(2)(1).
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As argued earlier, the Charter is not meant to make revolutionary changes to ASEAN.
Instead, the Charter will have to catalyze change and inspire reforms if ASEAN is to main-
tain its geopolitical stature and relevance. To "outlaw" or scrub out of existence norms that
have kept ASEAN relatively cohesive despite the vast differences between member states is
to undermine the foundations of ASEAN. Further, it is abundantly clear that interdepen-
dence in today's world does not make cooperation a foregone conclusion. This applies to
ASEAN where cooperation has to be consciously worked upon, encouraged, and scaled-
up in the years ahead. This paradox is profoundly manifested in ASEAN where bilateral
spats are still common; indeed, enlargement has made some of these bilateral disagreements
and tensions more marked. 10 4 Critics forget that ASEAN has throughout its history main-
tained its relevance by tinkering, not overhauling, then existing rules. ASEAN's institutional
path dependency, pivoting on the ASEAN Way, will necessarily mean that incremental-
ism is more likely to be accepted and implemented. It would be useful to bear in mind
that the ASEAN Charter does not represent a "big bang" approach to changing the inter-
nal dynamics, workings, and raison d'tre of ASEAN. A more nuanced interpretation is
needed. Instead, the Charter is a calibrated approach that seeks to manage change amidst
continuity.
Although the non-interference principle is maintained in the Charter, one could argue
that non-interference is now no longer the same creature that it was before November
2007. Article 20(1) stipulates that, as "a basic principle", consultation and consensus
shall be the basis of decision-making in ASEAN. Where consensus cannot be achieved,
the Charter provides that the ASEAN Summit "may decide how a specific decision can
be made". l 15 This is significant. First, it recognizes that while the default approach is
consultation and consensus, the Charter provides that the ASEAN Summit may decide on
a basis other than consensus. In egregious cases such as a serious breach of the Charter
or non-compliance, this means that the ASEAN Summit can possibly decide with a wider
latitude the options available. Second, the deliberate use of "decide" in the Charter is
significant because it connotes influencing or affecting resolutely the outcome of an issue.
Consensus and consultation may occasionally lack the decisive edge as "decide" does. True,
the ASEAN Summit is unlikely to deviate drastically from precedents and would be very
mindful of not unnecessarily derogating from ASEAN's principles enshrined in Article 2.
But the option is there. This option is repeated for unresolved disputes (Article 26), and
for non-compliance by a member state of findings, recommendations or decisions from an
ASEAN dispute settlement mechanism (Article 27). Thus, a significant but under-stated
inroad has been made in the consensual decision-making framework.
It is also noteworthy that the consensual decision-making has been over-hyped to the
point that it ignores the understanding among ASEAN member states that this does not
mean unanimity is necessary in every decision taken. What it means is that no member state
objects to a decision so strongly that it feels compelled to register its dissent. As a face-
saving gesture that is saliently necessary in associational life in Southeast Asia, consensual
decision-making results in no member state "losing face" as a consequence of being in the
minority camp. This is further supported by the fact that there are ASEAN agreements that
have come into force without requiring the ratification of all signatories. 10 6 For example,
the ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution requires only six ratifications. 10 7
Likewise, the Treaty on Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone requires only seven
104 N. Ganesan, Bilateral Tensions in Post-Cold War ASEAN (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies,
1999).
105 ASEAN Charter, supra note 2, art. 20(2).
106 The ASEAN Charter, however, requires ratification by all member states. See ibid., art. 47(2).
107 ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution, 10 June 2002 (entered into force 11 November 2003),
online: ASEAN <http://www.aseansec.org/images/agr-haze.pdf>.
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ratifications. 10 8 As discussed earlier, cognizant of the differential capacity of member states
to participate in different ASEAN projects in the economic realm, ASEAN has adopted the
"ASEAN minus X" or "2 + X" flexible participation formula so that economic projects are
not delayed by one or more member states. These member states can always join in when
they are ready. A good example is the ASEAN Free Trade Area where there is a two-track
system for the abolishment of all import duties: the original six ASEAN member states are
expected to comply by 2010 with the other four member states by 2015.
The Charter, without being explicit, has opened the door for a robust interpretation and
application of the norm of non-interference. The Charter seeks to preserve the benefits
of such a norm but is careful to manage the downsides. °9 To do away completely with
the norm is to make the Charter's signing and ratification untenable. More than that,
associational life in ASEAN can become fraught with tension, suspicion and disunity. These
are situations that the Charter seeks to avoid. By devolving the decision-making to the
Summit, the Charter preserves the norm while at the same time ensures that the norm is not
used to the collective detriment of ASEAN.
The original founding members 10 of ASEAN, viz Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines,
Singapore, and Thailand, adopted and religiously adhered to a policy of non-interference.
It was then a pragmatic and strategic policy given the bilateral spats and conflicts between
the founding members. The larger concern was the potential domino effect of communism
in the aftermath of the Vietnam War at its door step. The strategic imperative was to
develop national and regional resilience among the five non-communist original members of
ASEAN. Thus, the abiding demand for the sovereignty norm, encompassing non-interference
and consensual decision-making, was not surprising. There is a trade-off of course. The
downside of unbridled pragmatism is the inherent tendency to veer towards acting without
principle. Hence it is not unsurprising that keen observes have noted that "ASEAN's core
norms are affiliated with political realism, which might provide significant potential for
intermittent backsliding and unilateral reversals in Southeast Asian regionalism". 111
While ASEAN is keen to maintain the norm of non-interference as a means to sustain
regional comity, it is alive to the reality that the norm cannot be applied inflexibly especially
when internal developments in one member state affect other ASEAN members. Consulta-
tive and consensual decision-making had served ASEAN reasonably well in the early days
when ASEAN was smaller. Although such a mode of decision-making can contribute to
confidence-building, it can equally lead to indecision and incapacity to act resolutely and
implement effectively. This has been evident with the addition of new member states in
the 1990s, and with the geopolitical and geo-economic context being vastly different from
1967. Not only has decision-making become relatively more stymied and contentious but it
also strained ASEAN's reputed informal and cohesive way of getting things done. In turn,
the practical effect has been to enable a determined or recalcitrant member to hold ASEAN
to ransom. For example, Myanmar has been able to use this, in concert with the policy of
non-interference, to prevent ASEAN from acting more decisively and substantively on the
former's atrocious human rights record. If recent experience is to go by, this norm is being
re-interpreted and it is argued, in the following section, that this norm is not as sacrosanct
as it is often made out to be.
108 Treaty on Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone, 15 December 1995, (entered into force 28 March 1997,
art. 16(1)), online: ASEAN <http://www.aseansec.org/2082.htm>.
109 For the argument that the Charter is evidence of ASEAN's "cautious liberal turn", see J. Dosch, "ASEAN's
Reluctant Liberal Turn and the Thorny Road to Democracy Promotion" (2008) 21 Pac. Rev. 527. See also
E.M. Kuhonta, "Walking a Tightrope: Democracy versus Sovereignty in ASEAN's Illiberal Peace" (2006)
19 Pac. Rev. 337.
110 Brunei joined in 1984, Vietnam in 1995, Myanmar and Laos in 1997, and Cambodia in 1999.
111 J. Ruland and A. Jetschke, "40 Years of ASEAN: Perspectives, Performance and Lessons for Change" (2008)
21 Pac. Rev. 397at 406.
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B. Dealing with the Dilemma that Myanmar is: Non-interference
in Flux and in Retreat?
ASEAN's weakest link is perhaps Myanmar. Its continued constructive engagement with
Myanmar has resulted in no shortage of opprobrium, embarrassment, and angst to ASEAN.
Myanmar is seen as the lowest common denominator in ASEAN for civil and political rights
as well as human development. Despite the accusations of kids-glove treatment, complicity
and cowardice, ASEAN has steadfastly stood by Myanmar as an ASEAN member, defending
its "constructive engagement" policy. However, unhappiness within the ASEAN ranks has
been evident in the last couple of years but suspending or expelling Myanmar from ASEAN,
while talked about privately, has never been openly and seriously attempted as solutions. 112
For people inside and outside ASEAN, this is ASEAN's enigma: that its benign engagement
with the junta is seemingly a cover for inaction and ineffectiveness rather than a real pathway
of reform. 1
13
ASEAN is increasingly mindful of international opinion and pressure, and how Myan-
mar's internal developments are undermining ASEAN's effectiveness and derailing its
aspirations.1 14 As it is, in ASEAN's engagements with the US and EU, Myanmar has become
a thorn in the flesh for all concerned. In the process, ASEAN's standing and reputation has
suffered. 1 Ultimately, it is about geopolitical imperatives that brought and has kept Myan-
mar within the ASEAN fold. Moral vanity, manifested primarily in economic sanctions by
the US and EU, is not construed as a sensible policy for ASEAN. Expelling Myanmar, being
isolated as it is, will not solve or lead to beneficial changes for ASEAN. 116 Expelling Myan-
mar from ASEAN will not only exacerbate the problem for ASEAN but will unravel the
inclusive community aspiration of ASEAN.
In maintaining Myanmar's ASEAN membership, ASEAN believes that it is provided with
channels of communication with the military junta. A good example was in the aftermath
of Cyclone Nargis which hit Myanmar in May 2008. ASEAN with the UN mediated in
the stand-off between Myanmar and the international community over emergency relief
to those affected.' 1 7 The metaphor ASEAN uses is a familial one, in tandem with its
112 j. Drew, "Unity lacking on diplomatic approach to Burma's junta" The Washington Post (25 October
2007), online: The Washington Post <http:lwww.washingtonpost.comwp-dyncontent/article/2007/10/24/
AR2007102402756.html>; Zaid I., "Losing Patience with Burma" The Wall Street Journal Asia (12 January
2006) 15; S. H. Albar (Foreign Minister of Malaysia) "It is not possible to defend Myanmar" The Wall Street
Journal Asia (24 July 2006) ; "Suspend Myanmar from Asean" Straits Times (4 October 2007) ; "Disparate
views in Asean on crisis in the family" Straits Times (10 October 2007); and "The gathering mild rebuke"
The Economist (2 September 2006).
113 See damning indictment in M. Suryodiningrat, "Southeast Asian Nations Risk Dissension by Ignoring
Human Rights" YaleGlobal (4 August 2009) online: YaleGlobal Online <http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/ content/
southeast-asian-nations-risk-dissension-ignoring-human-rights>.
114 R. Katanyuu, "Beyond Non-Interference in ASEAN" (2006) 46 Asian Sur. 825; L.Z. Rahim, "Fragmented
Community and Unconstructive Engagements: ASEAN and Burma's SPDC Regime" (2008) 40 Crit. Asian
Stud. 67. A group of jurists has called on the UN Security Council to investigate into alleged crimes against
humanity and war crimes in Myanmar: see Crimes in Burma, (Report by the International Human Rights Clinic
at Harvard Law School, May 2009), online: <http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/ hrp/documents/Crimes-
in-Burma.pdf>.
115 V. Mallet, "Asia's former tigers are flirting with irrelevance" Financial Times-Asia (3 August 2006).
116 After all, the junta relies on isolation, and isolation will not lead to regime change. For a persuasive view of why
sanctions would not work on Myanmar, see Thant M-U, "What to do about Burma" 29(3) London Review
of Books 31, (8 February 2007). On the junta's intransigence post-September 2007, see A.M. Thawnghmung
and Maung A.M., "Myanmar in 2007: A Turning Point in the 'Roadmap'?" (2008) 48 Asian Sur. 13. See
also G. Sheridan, "Isolating Burma doesn't help," The Australian, (15 May 2008) online: The Australian
<http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,25197,23699758-5013 460,00.html>.
117 See M. Green and D. Mitchell, "Asia's Forgotten Crisis: A New Approach to Burma" 86 Foreign Affairs
(November-December 2007) 147, for their 'coordinated engagement' proposal involving ASEAN, China,
India, Japan, and the USA.
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communitarian perspective: Whatever the behaviour of a family member, it is still a family
member. Singapore's Foreign Minister discusses with frankness the challenge and dilemma
that Myanmar poses:
The military will continue to have a strong role to play. We believe that it is a
necessity, because while the military is part of the problem today, it has to be part of
the solution tomorrow. ASEAN considers Myanmar to be part of the family, maybe
an awkward member of the family but still a member of the family, and we will,
from that perspective, always view Myanmar differently from the way outsiders view
Myanmar... So from that perspective, our continued engagement of Myanmar may
not be viewed with favour by some of our European friends, but it is a matter of
absolute necessity and one which serves a our long-term interest in the region, and
which I believe will also serve European long-term interests in the region.
118
This is notwithstanding ASEAN's pragmatic assessment that it has limited influence and
leverage, compared with China or India, over Myanmar. However, ASEAN's view is that it
has some moral influence since Myanmar would rather be part of the ASEAN family rather
than be caught between India or China. 119 During Singapore's chairmanship of ASEAN in
2007-2008, Singapore's Foreign Minister enunciated ASEAN's realpolitik approach well:
But let us push that hypothetical possibility, say we expel Myanmar from ASEAN,
rid ourselves of a problem. What happens? Myanmar is the buffer state between
China and India. China has vast interests in Myanmar; India has vast interests in
Myanmar. If it is not a member of ASEAN, both sides will have to create options for
themselves in that country. And if there is internal discord, in self-defence, each will
have to interfere to protect its own self-interests. So if China and India are dragged
in, I think the Americans, the Japanese and the others will also be alarmed. In the
end, Myanmar can become an arena for big power conflicts. At that point in time,
our own interests will be dragged in too. So it would be better that we pinch our
noses, and bear with the problem, and keep Myanmar within ASEAN's table, than to
come to the conclusion that jumping out from the frying pan will land us in a cooler
situation. 120
Yet, in spite of ASEAN's determination to maintain ties with Myanmar, ASEAN has nei-
ther let Myanmar hold it back nor dictate the pace of ASEAN integration. Indeed, ASEAN
has also been prepared to chastise Myanmar. On 27 September 2007, George Yeo, at the
sidelines of the UN General Assembly and on behalf of ASEAN foreign ministers, stated
that the ASEAN foreign ministers were "appalled" to learn of the use of automatic weapons
and violence on the demonstrators.' 21 They also "expressed their revulsion" to their Myan-
mar counterpart.1 22 On the same day, Singapore's Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, in
Singapore's capacity as Chairman of the ASEAN Standing Committee, in consulting with
the leaders of Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam, noted
that the confrontation in Myanmar "would have implications for ASEAN and the whole
region. ASEAN therefore could not credibly remain silent or uninvolved in this matter".
123
118 Transcript of press conference of Singapore Minister for Foreign Affairs George Yeo and Czech Republic
Minister of Foreign Affairs Karel Schwazenberg, at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Prague, Czech Republic
(11 April 2008).
119 On Myanmar-ASEAN relations, see J. Haacke, Myanmar's Foreign Policy: Domestic Influences and
International Implications (London: Routledge, 2006) at 41-60.
120 Supra note 79.
121 Singapore Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), "MFA Spokesman's comments on PM Lee Hsien Loong calls
to ASEAN leaders on the Myanmar issue" (27 September 2007).
122 Ibid.
123 Ibid.
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Prime Minister Lee in a 29 September 2007 letter to Senior General Than Shwe (Myanmar's
top military leader) expressed ASEAN's "deep concerns ... over the very grave situation
in Myanmar".124 He noted that media coverage of events in Myanmar "have evoked the
revulsion of people throughout Southeast Asia and all over the world". 125 In giving recog-
nition to non-interference principle, PM Lee ended his letter by emphasizing that "ASEAN's
concerns are for the welfare of the people of Myanmar, for a return to stability and nor-
malcy, and for Myanmar to take its place among the comity of nations. I hope you will
consider these views in that spirit".1 26
These expressions of criticism, chastisement and rebuke have been more frequent in the
last few years. More recently, in May 2009, during the closed-door trial of Daw Aung San
Suu Kyi, who was charged with breaking the terms of her house arrest, ASEAN expressed its
"grave concern about recent developments.., given her fragile health". 127 In calling again
for the immediate release of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, ASEAN stated that Myanmar "has the
responsibility to protect and promote human rights". 128
It is clear that ASEAN has criticized Myanmar on its human rights record, especially in
recent years. Dissent is over whether ASEAN has done enough to bring a recalcitrant mem-
ber to task. Contrary to how it has been popularly presented in the media, non-interference is
not always rigidly adhered to by ASEAN. ASEAN's relationship with Myanmar is an exam-
ple. The Charter will give further impetus to this but it would be unrealistic to expect that
the norm will be done away with immediately. ASEAN has also sought the UN's assistance,
aware that it has little leverage and given how Myanmar has repudiated ASEAN in pref-
erence for the UN. The UN Secretary-General appointed Special Envoy Ibrahim Gambari,
who consults ASEAN leaders regularly, to be a neutral interlocutor to all parties in Myan-
mar. In October 2008, Tomfis Ojea Quintana, the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation
of human rights in Myanmar, reported to the UN General Assembly that democracy will
take decades to take root in Myanmar, and in the meantime tangible, step-by-step bench-
marks should be set up to spur progress towards national reconciliation and promotion of
democracy there. 12
9
Critics and media reports tend to portray the norm of non-interference as a non-negotiable
principle. The reality is that the norm is not a sacred cow that it has been made out to be.
ASEAN has undoubtedly "interfered" before, even if rarely and far between, in the internal
affairs of its members: the Philippine political crisis of 1986 involving President Marcos, the
forest fires and the haze in Indonesia in the late 1990s, and Myanmar's internal situation.
130
124 MFA, Press Release, "Letter from Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong to Senior General Than Shwe, Chairman,
State Peace and Development Council, Union of Myanmar" (9 September 2007).
125 Ibid.
126 Ibid.
127 See the ASEAN Chairman's statement issued by Thailand of 19 May 2009, online: ASEAN <http://www.
aseansec.org/PR-ASEANChairmanStatementonMyanmar.pdf>.
128 Ibid.
129 See UN General Assembly (Third Committee-Social, Humanitarian, Cultural), Press Release
GA/SHC/3926, (23 October 2008), online: United Nations <http://www.un.orgfNews/briefings/docs/
2008/ 081023_Quintana.doc.htm>. The United Nations Human Rights Council's special procedures
mandate on human rights in Myanmar began in 1992. See further the Myanmar homepage on
the website of the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, online:
<http://www.ohchr.org/en/countries/asiaregion/pages/mmindex.aspx>. At a press conference, Tomfs Ojea
Quintana, Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar said in response to reporters'
questions, "To get a civil Government will take time. They [Myanmar] are not prepared for that. They are
prepared for war." He added that the process to democracy can be helped by tackling the country's human
rights challenges. He also urged the international community to speak in one voice as they nudged Myanmar
towards a democratic Government and the elections scheduled for 2010.
130 See also L. Jones, "ASEAN Intervention in Cambodia: From Cold War to Conditionality" (2007) 20 Pac. Rev.
523. Jones argues that ASEAN elites had regularly intervened in the Cambodia's internal political conflicts
between 1979 and 1999.
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A little articulated perspective on ASEAN's stance on non-interference is that ASEAN
is coming to grips with the limitations of traditional sovereignty. Increasingly, the prin-
ciple of "responsible sovereignty" is gaining currency. Responsible sovereignty is "the
idea that states must take responsibility for the external effects of their domestic actions-
that sovereignty entails obligations and duties towards other sovereign states as well as
to one's own citizens". 13' Kishore Mahbubani expresses the idea thus: "No village can
accept a home whose actions endanger the village. Neither can the global village accept
the behaviour of nations which endanger the globe". 132 This emerging norm emphasizes
the dual importance of sovereignty and responsibility. Sovereignty recognizes that states
remain the primary actors of the international system. Responsibility highlights the need
for international cooperation among states, rather than unilateral action, "to meet the most
fundamental demands of sovereignty: to protect their people and advance their interests" 133
ASEAN must come to grips with this emerging international norm. 134 With closer and
more intense scrutiny by EU, the United States of America, investors, and civil society orga-
nizations, ASEAN can ill-afford to ignore such a norm as well as international, regional,
and local sentiments. Disregarding such a norm will undoubtedly present constraints in
ASEAN's engagement with key political and economic partners. More fundamentally,
ASEAN will also have difficulty justifying its non-observance of prevailing and emerging
international norms to the domestic constituencies as well.
IV. THE CHARTER IN RECALIBRATING NORMS AND CATALYZING SOCIAL LEARNING
The soft law approach pivots on the centrality of developing commitment to common values
and ideals that all member states can identify with and use to guide their policy responses,
activities and interactions vis-?,-vis ASEAN and other member states. Given the differing
attitudes and interests of member states towards ASEAN, the Charter is arguably more
effective in reinforcing, rather than enforcing, the normative environment of ASEAN.
135
Even if we do not accept that premise, we can appreciate the abiding commitment to the non-
interference and consensus within ASEAN. These norms were the bedrock of ASEAN for
much of its existence and enabled ASEAN to confidence-build in the tumultuous early years.
It also enabled ASEAN to welcome into its fold the Indochinese members which subscribed
to very different political ideologies and have vastly poorer socio-economic backgrounds.
Crucially, these norms helped ameliorate suspicion, and reduced the tendency to resort to
force in what was previously an endemically conflict-ridden region. As the constructivist
school of international relations argues, it is the collective norms of non-violence in inter-
state relations, with consultation and consensus as critical elements that have shaped ASEAN
member states' attitudes and identities.1 36 The Charter has invited the reconsideration of
the relevance and saliency of these norms in the current efforts to make ASEAN a rule-based
131 Managing Global Insecurity (MGI), A Plan for Action: A New Era of International Cooperation for a Changed
World: 2009, 2010, and Beyond (Washington, DC, New York, Stanford: MGI, 2008) at 10-14. MGI is a joint
project of the Brookings Institution, Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation,
and New York University's Center on International Cooperation.
132 Ibid., at. 11.
133 Ibid.
134 See, further, the discussion of the linkage between responsible sovereignty and intervention in E.M. Kuhonta,
"Toward Responsible Sovereignty: The Case for Intervention" in D.K. Emmerson, ed., Hard Choices: Security,
Democracy, and Regionalism in Southeast Asia (Stanford, CA: Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research
Centre, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Stanford University, 2008).
135 As Narine argues, ASEAN matters for its role in "reinforcing the normative environment of the region". See
S. Narine, "Forty Years of ASEAN: A Historical Review" (2008) 19 Pac. Rev. 199.
136 See, for example, A. Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem
ofRegional Order (London: Routledge, 2001).
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organization, and to renew its relevance in a rapidly changing geopolitical and economic
environment.
While the Charter seeks to give substantive effect to the purposes and principles of
ASEAN, it is its potential transformative capacity that should not be easily dismissed. This
arises from the Charter's potential of promoting the internalization of the values that are
deemed critical to ASEAN's growth and development. As ASEAN seeks to re-energize itself,
the key challenge is to ensure that the Charter spearheads the generation of norms and
behaviour that become self-enforcing and provide the substratum and impetus for engen-
dering the desired norms. Self-enforcing norms and behaviour refer to the state of affairs
in which the laws, when prudently applied, acquire legitimacy and increasingly become
inviolable.
Although the Charter is a binding legal instrument, the way it was drafted enables a sig-
nificant degree of flexible interpretation and room for negotiation. This inherent flexibility
is an encapsulation of the ASEAN way, rendered as a principle of ASEAN governance, and
continues to be the foundation for the common rules of engagement. Accordingly, the dis-
cursive power of soft law facilitates the socialization of ASEAN member states in imbibing
the desired values and norms, and helps generate trust that can be more sustainable than a
plethora of treaty law.
Crafting the Charter as hard law, but with soft law features and effects, is a calibrated
measure to combine reflexive self-regulation on the part of member states and light-touch
regulation on the part of ASEAN. Such an approach would promote constitutive processes
such as persuasion, learning, cooperation and socialization, while also providing some assur-
ance that ASEAN, as a legal personality, is not attempting to derogate the ASEAN Way.137
The Charter's subtext is of a normative, desired state of inter-government governmental-
ity but short of the pooling of sovereignty, which the EU epitomizes. On the other hand,
the Charter, if properly internalized, can encourage and facilitate compliance. This in turn
would enhance ASEAN's organizational efficiency and effectiveness. The norms that the
Charter embodies are more likely to have greater traction and be sustainable through its
calibrated response to a diverse range of interests, concerns, and priorities among member
states. In this way, the incremental ASEAN governmentality will facilitate the development
of the organization's cognitive and affective ability to deal with the myriad of complex issues
and imperatives that domestic politics inflected by nationalistic sentiments can arouse.
To reiterate, the Charter has not done away with its cherished norms of non-interference
and consensual decision-making. 138 At one extreme, the Charter codifies many of ASEAN's
existing practices, values and norms. These norms were apt in the earlier years but have
become anachronistic and quixotic in the last two decades. The Charter and the EPG
report have made tentative inroads by questioning the relevance of these two much-vaunted
norms. It would be unrealistic to expect that these norms will be done away in the short
to medium term. The more likely scenario is that ASEAN and its individual members will
be less insistent on using those norms as a crutch, or as a matter of political convenience.
The norms will be titrated down by custom and practice within and outside ASEAN. The
recalibration of the norms has been saliently incorporated into the Charter.
137 Simon Tay argues that the espousal of the responsive Asian Way has enabled ASEAN to continue to evolve:
S.S.C. Tay, "Institutions and Processes: Dilemmas and Possibilities" in S.S.C. Tay, J.P. Estanislao and H. Soe-
sastro, eds., Reinventing ASEAN (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2001). See also A. Jetschke
and J. Ruland, "Decoupling Rhetoric and Practice: The Cultural Limits of ASEAN Cooperation" (2009) 22
Pac. Rev. 179.
138 On the origins and purposes of non-interference in ASEAN, see H.E.S. Nesadurai, "The Association of South-
east Asian Nations (ASEAN)" (2008) 13 New Pol. Econ. 225. For a more extensive discourse on ASEAN
founding ethos and norms, see A.D. Ba, (Re)Negotiating East and Southeast Asia: Region, Regionalism, and
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009).
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While one should not certainly view the Charter as the death knell for the challenged
norms, the Charter still does not adequately guide ASEAN on how to deal with a situ-
ation in which local practice and policy is at odds with the purposes and principles of
ASEAN. The Charter may then be relegated to secondary importance if the approach
taken is one of ad-hoc decisions by ASEAN's supreme decision-making body. As such,
the quest for a principles-based organization is hampered. This, however, is not a sugges-
tion that a stridently bureaucratic and inflexible Charter for ASEAN is preferred. Rather,
the lack of a clear, principled, and legitimate approach only denies the Charter and ASEAN
of much needed credibility. The basic requirement is for the Charter to assist, to facili-
tate the institutionalization of a principled-based decision-making without fear or favour
of encrusted norms being honoured as organizational relics that have long outlived their
purpose.
ASEAN's relevance as a regional organization will ultimately hinge on its ability to
entrench norms within ASEAN but also calibrate itself such that its practices can be rec-
onciled with the normative orders outside ASEAN. It is a truism that "no man is an
island"; likewise for ASEAN. ASEAN's geopolitical relevance is a function of internal and,
increasingly, external developments. External developments-and whether ASEAN can keep
pace-are more challenging since internal developments are largely within its control while
the latter are not. In this regard, ASEAN's persistent and self-interested conceptions of com-
munity and its self-interests will find difficulty in having buy-in from internal and external
stakeholders if that norm is out of sync with generally accepted international norms or lacks
legitimacy. The Charter can be looked upon as a legal-political nudge in which ASEAN
increasingly will have to calibrate its actions and policies to be in line with the prevailing
normative framework globally. The Charter is a means to the end of regional integration in
a region that is so diverse along geographical, socio-economic, political, historical, ethnic
(race, language, and religion) lines that community building cannot be achieved by fiat. As
it is, Southeast Asians do not think of ASEAN as a community.1 39
The Economist had derisively described the Charter as "toothless", "contains little more
than waffle" and commits ASEAN leaders "to nothing that matters".14 ° Indeed, such stri-
dent criticisms of ASEAN are not new, and neither are they lacking in merit, as this article
acknowledges. The aspirations in Chapter 1 of the Charter seem pious when juxtaposed
against the processes, mechanisms and powers provided in the Charter. It is still early days
and the Charter is but the first, albeit important, step in a long journey. Nevertheless, the
inherent weakness of ASEAN and the Charter is its "one-for-all and all-for-one" mindset.
For too long, ASEAN has moved at a pace that accommodated as many, if not all, members
as possible. This is a real structural constraint and ideational rigidity not so much of ASEAN
but of its member states. At that stage of its early to mid-development, ASEAN had rightly
prioritized unity, manifested in consensus and non-interference, over separateness. But this
realist approach is no longer sustainable as the Charter implicitly acknowledges.
The Charter also represents a compromise among ASEAN member states. The key rec-
ommendations by the EPG on human rights and civil society were watered-down or excluded
from the final Charter document. The compromise also represents the ASEAN practice of
not allowing a single issue to dominate the agenda. Singapore's Prime Minister Lee Hsien
Loong gave a sense of how the Charter was readied so that it would be signed on by all
members: "[The Charter] cannot compel the countries to do things which they do not want
to agree to in the first place". 4 ' While this approach might strike some as another example
of the "lowest common denominator" approach, it is another institutional constraint that
139 E. Thomson and C. Thianthai, Awareness of and Attitudes toward ASEAN: Summary Findings from a Ten
Nation Survey Uakarta: ASEAN Foundation, 2008).
140 Cf. R. Stubbs, "The ASEAN Alternative? Ideas, Institutions and the Challenge to 'Global' Governance"
(2008) 21 Pac. Rev. 451; S. Narine, "Forty Years of ASEAN: A Historical Review" (2008) 21Pac. Rev. 411.
141 "Charter must be agreeable to all members: PM Lee" Straits Times (8 August 2007).
(2008)
THE ASEAN CHARTER AS "LEGS TO GO PLACES"
ASEAN has to manage and live with. The enigmatic priority is to keep all ten member states
in ASEAN rather than to marginalize or exclude even one member.
But the Charter provides a normative framework for change amidst continuity that can
be built upon. With the hardware in place, hard-nosed decisions will have to be made if
the Charter is to be a springboard to renewed relevance and influence in a rapidly evolv-
ing geopolitical environment. All things considered, the promulgation of the Charter is
necessary but insufficient in making ASEAN a strong and cohesive inter-governmental orga-
nization. The real test now that the Charter has been ratified is whether ASEAN and its
members are committed to the principles, values, duties in both form and substance. If
shared vision and shared purpose, grounded in shared values, are absent, the Charter will
become a way station to ASEAN's irrelevance. The next phase of regional integration, as
envisioned by the Charter, requires ASEAN's institutionalization of its institutions, pro-
cesses, and values. The convergence of common values among the ASEAN member states
is therefore a sine qua non.
V. CONCLUSION
ASEAN started life at the height of the Vietnam War as a united front Cold War political
association, fighting the communist threat. This was its life-blood for a good part of its
existence. Over the years, it has added economic and socio-cultural objectives to breathe new
life into an organization that also enlarged with new members. ASEAN has set a deadline
of 2015 (brought forward from 2020) for the creation of a regional community and a single
market of more than 570 million people. Annually, ASEAN has more than 700 meetings
at various levels. Despite the criticisms, member states believe that the Charter can help
ASEAN along its development path. It appears, even if tentatively, that the Charter has
given impetus to the requirement that community interests would prevail over national ones
on matters that affect ASEAN. Secondly, the Charter has started the process of developing
ASEAN's capacity to enforce decisions, resolve disputes, and implement policies. Thirdly,
there is the reappraisal of common values, including that of non-interference. All things
considered, the Charter provides a framework for gradual and structured change.
Despite the many hiccups, the Charter was adopted, ratified, and entered into force as
anticipated. On 1 January 2009, the Committee of Permanent Representatives to ASEAN,
comprising ambassadorial-ranked representatives from every ASEAN member based in
Jakarta, was established. The incremental process towards bringing human rights, albeit
ASEAN-style, continues. The first draft of the terms of reference of the ASEAN human
right body was presented at the postponed 14th Summit in Thailand. A High Level Panel
(HLP) on an ASEAN human rights body has also been established. 14 1 It has prepared the
first draft of the terms of reference of the ASEAN human rights body. The plan is for the
ASEAN Human Rights Body (AHRB) to be inaugurated and operationalized by the 15th
ASEAN Summit at the end of 2009.143
142 For the membership of the HLP on human rights body, see List of Members of the High Level Panel on
an ASEAN Human Rights Body, online: ASEAN <http://www.aseansec.org/HLP-Member.pdf>. For the
terms of reference, approved at the 4V ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in July 2008 see Terms of Refer-
ence for the High Level Panel on an ASEAN Human Rights Body, online: Association of Southeast Asian
Nations< http://wvw.aseansec.org/HLP-TOR.pdf>.
143 See the Chairman's statement at the 14th ASEAN Summit, online: ASEAN <http://wwv.aseansec.org/
22328.htm>. The statement noted that "the establishment of the AHRB to promote and protect human
rights of ASEAN's peoples would be one of the most important undertakings to make ASEAN a genuinely
people-oriented community." See also ASEAN Political-Security Community Blueprint, para. A.1.5, online:
ASEAN <http://www.aseansec.org/22337.pdf>. A High Level Legal Experts' Group on Follow-up to the
ASEAN Charter (HLEG) is also likely to be established. See 14th ASEAN Summit, Press Release (27 February
2009) online: ASEAN <http://www.asean.org/22313.pdf>.
12 SYBIL
SINGAPORE YEAR BOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
It is still premature to make a prognosis as to whether the Charter will catalyze the attain-
ment of ASEAN's "One Vision, One Identity, One Community" by the year 2015. The
ratification of the Charter is a major step towards the realization of ASEAN "as a concert of
Southeast Asian nations, outward-looking, living in peace, stability and progress, bonded
in partnership in dynamic development and in a community of caring societies".144 The
journey ahead is long and challenging. Too realist, too little idealism-is that the ASEAN
Charter's fate? Is the ASEAN glass half-full or half-empty as a consequence? The funda-
mental question now is not whether ASEAN needs a Charter but rather how the Charter
and its subsequent evolution will keep ASEAN firmly in the driver's seat in Southeast Asia.
Whatever its flaws, the Charter provides a road-map. Whether the compass of the subtly
modified ASEAN Way can take ASEAN to where it wants to go will depend on ASEAN
recalibrating its norms, values and purpose to remain nimble, relevant, and effective in an
increasingly uncertain world.
144 Cebu Declaration on the Blueprint of the ASEAN Charter, supra note 5.
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